Related papers: Committee Elections with Candidate Attribute Const…
Polarization is a major concern for a well-functioning society. Often, mass polarization of a society is driven by polarizing political representation, even when the latter is easily preventable. The existing computational social choice…
The knapsack problem (KP) is a very famous NP-hard problem in combinatorial optimization. Also its generalization to multiple dimensions named d-dimensional knapsack problem (d-KP) and to multiple knapsacks named multiple knapsack problem…
Given an election, a preferred candidate p, and a budget, the SHIFT BRIBERY problem asks whether p can win the election after shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders. Of course, shifting comes at a price (depending on the voter…
The NP-hard general factor problem asks, given a graph and for each vertex a list of integers, whether the graph has a spanning subgraph where each vertex has a degree that belongs to its assigned list. The problem remains NP-hard even if…
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certain nice structure, as for instance single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted,…
We determine the complexity of several constraint satisfaction problems using the heuristic algorithm, WalkSAT. At large sizes N, the complexity increases exponentially with N in all cases. Perhaps surprisingly, out of all the models…
We study the properties of elections that have a given position matrix (in such elections each candidate is ranked on each position by a number of voters specified in the matrix). We show that counting elections that generate a given…
The constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) involves deciding, given a set of variables and a set of constraints on the variables, whether or not there is an assignment to the variables satisfying all of the constraints. One formulation of…
Fairness in multiwinner elections is studied in varying contexts. For instance, diversity of candidates and representation of voters are both separately termed as being fair. A common denominator to ensure fairness across all such contexts…
A standard type of uncertainty set in robust optimization is budgeted uncertainty, where an interval of possible values for each parameter is given and the total deviation from their lower bounds is bounded. In the two-stage setting,…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
We study the problem of fair $k$-committee selection under an egalitarian objective. Given $n$ agents partitioned into $m$ groups (\eg, demographic quotas), the goal is to aggregate their preferences to form a committee of size $k$ that…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
A central question in computer science and statistics is whether efficient algorithms can achieve the information-theoretic limits of statistical problems. Many computational-statistical tradeoffs have been shown under average-case…
We study the complexity of determining a winning committee under the Chamberlin--Courant voting rule when voters' preferences are single-crossing on a line, or, more generally, on a median graph (this class of graphs includes, e.g., trees…
Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…
We study a version of the metric facility location problem (or, equivalently, variants of the committee selection problem) in which we must choose $k$ facilities in an arbitrary metric space to serve some set of clients $C$. We consider…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
Bipartite b-matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to one or more agents or items on the other, is a classical model that is used in myriad application areas such as healthcare, advertising, education, and general…