Related papers: Monotone Randomized Apportionment
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
The related concepts of partisan belief systems, issue alignment, and partisan sorting are central to our understanding of politics. These phenomena have been studied using measures of alignment between pairs of topics, or how much…
Randomness is viewed through an analogy between a physical quantity, density of gas, and a mathematical construct -- probability density. Boltzmann's deduction of equilibrium distribution of ideal gas placed in an external potential field…
We study functions that produce a ranking of $n$ individuals from $n$ such rankings and are impartial in the sense that the position of an individual in the output ranking does not depend on the input ranking submitted by that individual.…
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
We study the space requirements of a sorting algorithm where only items that at the end will be adjacent are kept together. This is equivalent to the following combinatorial problem: Consider a string of fixed length n that starts as a…
We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from…
Understanding the likelihood for an election to be tied is a classical topic in many disciplines including social choice, game theory, political science, and public choice. Despite a large body of literature and the common belief that ties…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle.…
Population protocols are a relatively novel computational model in which very resource-limited anonymous agents interact in pairs with the goal of computing predicates. We consider the probabilistic version of this model, which naturally…
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency,…
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…
In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select $k$-member committees based on voters' approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the justified representation (JR) axiom, which demands that no large…
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should…
Graph aggregation is the process of computing a single output graph that constitutes a good compromise between several input graphs, each provided by a different source. One needs to perform graph aggregation in a wide variety of…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…
We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference ordering over platforms. Each platform enforces group…
A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…