Related papers: Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stack…
In this study, we explore the application of game theory, in particular Stackelberg games, to address the issue of effective coordination strategy generation for heterogeneous robots with one-way communication. To that end, focusing on the…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
This paper considers two investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection with asymmetric information: one knows the true stock dynamics, while the other has to infer the true dynamics from observed stock evolution. Their portfolio…
We present and study a partial-information model of online learning, where a decision maker repeatedly chooses from a finite set of actions, and observes some subset of the associated losses. This naturally models several situations where…
We study Stackelberg (leader--follower) tuning of network parameters (tolls, capacities, incentives) in combinatorial congestion games, where selfish users choose discrete routes (or other combinatorial strategies) and settle at a…
We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in infinite-horizon discounted zero-sum Markov games. We focus on the practical but challenging setting of decentralized MARL, where agents make decisions without coordination by a…
Federated learning is a new learning paradigm for extracting knowledge from distributed data. Due to its favorable properties in preserving privacy and saving communication costs, it has been extensively studied and widely applied to…
Federated learning (FL) is susceptible to a range of security threats. Although various defense mechanisms have been proposed, they are typically non-adaptive and tailored to specific types of attacks, leaving them insufficient in the face…
Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning is a powerful tool to solve many real-world cooperative tasks, but restrictions of real-world applications may require training the agents in a fully decentralized manner. Due to the lack of…
This paper is concerned with the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy for linear-quadratic leader-follower game. Completely different from the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg strategy, the solvability of the closed-loop solution even the…
According to the standard imitation protocol, a less successful player adopts the strategy of the more successful one faithfully for future success. This is the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory that explores the vitality of competing…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
This paper addresses the problem of online learning in a dynamic setting. We consider a social network in which each individual observes a private signal about the underlying state of the world and communicates with her neighbors at each…
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…
Recent applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), from wildlife crime to urban crime, have employed machine learning tools to learn and predict adversary behavior using available data about defender-adversary interactions. Given…
The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal…