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We study the problem of finding personalized reserve prices for unit-demand buyers in multi-unit eager VCG auctions with correlated buyers. The input to this problem is a dataset of submitted bids of $n$ buyers in a set of auctions. The…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
Selling reserved instances (or virtual machines) is a basic service in cloud computing. In this paper, we consider a more flexible pricing model for instance reservation, in which a customer can propose the time length and number of…
We present a new method for multi-agent planning involving human drivers and autonomous vehicles (AVs) in unsignaled intersections, roundabouts, and during merging. In multi-agent planning, the main challenge is to predict the actions of…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
Multiagent systems can use commitments as the core of a general coordination infrastructure, supporting both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions. Agents whose objectives are aligned, and where one agent can help another achieve…
We analyze the problem of how to optimally bid for ad spaces in online ad auctions. For this we consider the general case of multiple ad campaigns with overlapping targeting criteria. In our analysis we first characterize the structure of…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The optimal mechanism is two-stage: at stage-1 bidders register…
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure problem. Given the gap in understanding of general simultaneous…
As blockchains begin processing significant economic activity, the ability to include and order transactions inevitably becomes highly valuable, a concept known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). This makes effective mechanisms for…
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not know the correlation structure of the joint distribution of bidders'…
In this paper, we propose a bid optimizer for sponsored keyword search auctions which leads to better retention of advertisers by yielding attractive utilities to the advertisers without decreasing the revenue to the search engine. The bid…
The Greedy algorithm is the simplest heuristic in sequential decision problem that carelessly takes the locally optimal choice at each round, disregarding any advantages of exploring and/or information gathering. Theoretically, it is known…
We propose an analytically tractable variation of the minority game in which rational agents use probabilistic strategies. In our model, $N$ agents choose between two alternatives repeatedly, and those who are in the minority get a pay-off…
We formulate and analyze a generic sequential resource access problem arising in a variety of engineering fields, where a user disposes a number of heterogeneous computing, communication, or storage resources, each characterized by the…
In this paper, we propose a novel negotiation dialogue agent designed for the online marketplace. Our agent is integrative in nature i.e, it possesses the capability to negotiate on price as well as other factors, such as the addition or…
We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play…