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We consider the "Offline Ad Slot Scheduling" problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to "sponsored search" slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not…
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…
We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee $e/(e-1)$…
The interval scheduling problem is one variant of the scheduling problem. In this paper, we propose a novel variant of the interval scheduling problem, whose definition is as follows: given jobs are specified by their {\em release times},…
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
The problem of designing a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism with flexible consumers and costly heterogeneous supply is considered. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a…
Power producers use a wide range of decision support systems to manage and plan for sales in the day-ahead electricity market, and they are often faced with the challenge of choosing the most advantageous bidding strategy for any given day.…
We consider the problem of optimal bidding for virtual trading in two-settlement electricity markets. A virtual trader aims to arbitrage on the differences between day-ahead and real-time market prices; both prices, however, are random and…
Autonomous robots are increasingly utilized in realistic scenarios with multiple complex tasks. In these scenarios, there may be a preferred way of completing all of the given tasks, but it is often in conflict with optimal execution.…
In this work, we investigate the sum-rate performance of multicell and cell-free massive MIMO systems using linear precoding and multiuser scheduling algorithms. We consider the use of a network-centric clustering approach to reduce the…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
Developing efficient sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions is an important practical challenge in various marketing tasks. In this setting, the bidding agent obtains information, on both the value of the item at sale and the…
Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best…
The partial alignment and conflict of autonomous agents lead to mixed-motive scenarios in many real-world applications. However, agents may fail to cooperate in practice even when cooperation yields a better outcome. One well known reason…
We consider a team of autonomous agents that navigate in an adversarial environment and aim to achieve a task by allocating their resources over a set of target locations. An adversary in the environment observes the autonomous team's…
The ad-trading desks of media-buying agencies are increasingly relying on complex algorithms for purchasing advertising inventory. In particular, Real-Time Bidding (RTB) algorithms respond to many auctions -- usually Vickrey auctions --…
We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that…
We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable, which the bidder may want to conceal or partially reveal,…
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…