Related papers: Evolutionary game dynamics with environmental feed…
Eco-evolutionary frameworks can explain certain features of communities in which ecological and evolutionary processes occur over comparable timescales. Here, we investigate whether an evolutionary dynamics may interact with the spatial…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…
Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship --- the periodic frequency of a game is determined by the payoff matrix of the game. This paper reports the first experimental evidence to demonstrate this relationship. Evidence comes…
Evolutionary transitions among ecological interactions are widely known, although their detailed dynamics remain absent for most population models. Adaptive dynamics has been used to illustrate how the parameters of population models might…
We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provides a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call {\sigma} law,…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A…
In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game…
Game theory deals with strategic interactions among players and evolutionary game dynamics tracks the fate of the players' populations under selection. In this paper, we consider the replicator equation for two-player-two-strategy games…
Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of "zero-determinant" strategies has rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This…
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…
Evolutionary and ecosystem dynamics are often treated as different processes --operating at separate timescales-- even if evidence reveals that rapid evolutionary changes can feed back into ecological interactions. A recent long-term field…
Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
In social dilemmas, individuals face a conflict between their own self-interest and the collective interest of the group. The provision of reward has been shown to be an effective means to drive cooperation in such situations. However,…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
We investigate the effects of update rules on the dynamics of an evolutionary game-theoretic model - the N-player evolutionary trust game - consisting of three types of players: investors, trustworthy trustees, and untrustworthy trustees.…