Related papers: Evolutionary game dynamics with environmental feed…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing…
Evolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology. Applications of this theory range from cell dynamics to social evolution. However, many applications make it clear that inherent…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
We study the interplay between evolutionary game and network structure and show how the dynamics of the game affect the growth pattern of the network and how the evolution of the network influence the cooperative behavior in the game.…
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…
Exploring the possible consequences of spatial reciprocity on the evolution of cooperation is an intensively studied research avenue. Related works assumed a certain interaction graph of competing players and studied how particular…
Frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on…
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…
We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…
We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…