Related papers: First-order (coarse) correlated equilibria in non-…
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main…
Gradient-based methods enable efficient search capabilities in high dimensions. However, in order to apply them effectively in offline optimization paradigms such as offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) or Imitation Learning (IL), we require…
We consider a basic resource allocation game, where the players' strategy spaces are subsets of $R^m$ and cost/utility functions are parameterized by some common vector $u\in R^m$ and, otherwise, only depend on the own strategy choice. A…
A wide array of modern machine learning applications - from adversarial models to multi-agent reinforcement learning - can be formulated as non-cooperative games whose Nash equilibria represent the system's desired operational states.…
We study online convex optimization with constraints consisting of multiple functional constraints and a relatively simple constraint set, such as a Euclidean ball. As enforcing the constraints at each time step through projections is…
Recent applications that arise in machine learning have surged significant interest in solving min-max saddle point games. This problem has been extensively studied in the convex-concave regime for which a global equilibrium solution can be…
Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payo s) is…
We study a variant of a recently introduced min-max optimization framework where the max-player is constrained to update its parameters in a greedy manner until it reaches a first-order stationary point. Our equilibrium definition for this…
In this paper, we propose a systematic approach for extending first-order optimization algorithms, originally designed for unconstrained strongly convex problems, to handle closed and convex set constraints. We show that the resulting…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a game whose strategy space is continuous without access to gradients of the utility function. Such games arise, for example, when players' strategies are represented by…
In practical applications, decision-makers with heterogeneous dynamics may be engaged in the same decision-making process. This motivates us to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which players are mixed-order (first-…
Two of the most prominent algorithms for solving unconstrained smooth games are the classical stochastic gradient descent-ascent (SGDA) and the recently introduced stochastic consensus optimization (SCO) [Mescheder et al., 2017]. SGDA is…
Stable concurrent learning and control of dynamical systems is the subject of adaptive control. Despite being an established field with many practical applications and a rich theory, much of the development in adaptive control for nonlinear…
This paper investigates the sublinear regret guarantees of two non-no-regret algorithms in zero-sum games: Fictitious Play, and Online Gradient Descent with constant stepsizes. In general adversarial online learning settings, both…
We study Markov potential games under the infinite horizon average reward criterion. Most previous studies have been for discounted rewards. We prove that both algorithms based on independent policy gradient and independent natural policy…
We identify three common cases that lead to overestimation of adversarial accuracy against bounded first-order attack methods, which is popularly used as a proxy for adversarial robustness in empirical studies. For each case, we propose…
This paper studies an $N$-coalition non-cooperative game problem, where the players in the same coalition cooperatively minimize the sum of their local cost functions under a directed communication graph, while collectively acting as a…
An universal primal-dual approach of description equilibriums in large class of hierarchical congestion population games is proposed. At the very core of the approach is hierarchy of enclosed to each other transport networks. In different…
We study a class of deterministic mean field games and related optimal control problems, with a finite time horizon and in which the state space is a network. An agent controls her velocity, and, when she occupies a vertex, she can either…
Motivated by applications to online advertising and recommender systems, we consider a game-theoretic model with delayed rewards and asynchronous, payoff-based feedback. In contrast to previous work on delayed multi-armed bandits, we focus…