Related papers: First-order (coarse) correlated equilibria in non-…

Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning…

Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…

We show that learning algorithms satisfying a $\textit{low approximate regret}$ property experience fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games. Our property, which simply requires that each learner has…

We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an…

Gradient-based algorithms have shown great promise in solving large (two-player) zero-sum games. However, their success has been mostly confined to the low-precision regime since the number of iterations grows polynomially in $1/\epsilon$,…

This paper considers convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available information. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that…

Constrained Markov games offer a formal mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning problems where the behavior of the agents is subject to constraints. In this work, we focus on the recently introduced class of…

We consider online optimization in the 1-lookahead setting, where the objective does not decompose additively over the rounds of the online game. The resulting formulation enables us to deal with non-stationary and/or long-term constraints…

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow…

In this paper we study evolutive first order Mean Field Games in the Heisenberg group; each agent can move in the whole space but it has to follow "horizontal" trajectories which are given in terms of the vector fields generating the group…

We consider the setting where the nodes of an undirected, connected network collaborate to solve a shared objective modeled as the sum of smooth functions. We assume that each summand is privately known by a unique node. NEAR-DGD is a…

We develop a simple yet efficient Lagrangian method for computing equilibrium prices in a mean-field game price-formation model. We prove that equilibrium prices are optimal in terms of a suitable criterion and derive a primal-dual…

The success of adversarial formulations in machine learning has brought renewed motivation for smooth games. In this work, we focus on the class of stochastic Hamiltonian methods and provide the first convergence guarantees for certain…

We develop new perturbation techniques for conducting convergence analysis of various first-order algorithms for a class of nonsmooth optimization problems. We consider the iteration scheme of an algorithm to construct a perturbed…

We propose the concept of a Lagrangian game to solve constrained Markov games. Such games model scenarios where agents face cost constraints in addition to their individual rewards, that depend on both agent joint actions and the evolving…

Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…

This article presents the variant of the approach introduced in the recent work of Bensoussan, Wong, Yam and Yuan [13] to the generic first-order mean field game problem. A major contribution here is the provision of new crucial a priori…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

We consider a class of fully stochastic and fully distributed algorithms, that we prove to learn equilibria in games. Indeed, we consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics that we prove to converge weakly (in the sense of weak…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…