Related papers: Generalizing Better Response Paths and Weakly Acyc…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether…

This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…

This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…

We investigate the fluctuations induced by irrationality in simple games with a large number of competing players. We show that Nash equilibria in such games are ``weakly'' stable: irrationality propagates and amplifies through players'…

In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…

Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide…

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…

We consider strongly monotone games with convex separable coupling constraints, played by dynamical agents, in a partial-decision information scenario. We start by designing continuous-time fully distributed feedback controllers, based on…

The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may…

We analyze a system of partial differential equations that model a potential mean field game of controls, briefly MFGC. Such a game describes the interaction of infinitely many negligible players competing to optimize a personal value…

In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…

We study the typical structure of games in terms of their connectivity properties. A game is said to be `connected' if it has a pure Nash equilibrium and the property that there is a best-response path from every action profile which is not…

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…