Related papers: A Dominance Argument Against Incompleteness
A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is; second, it must satisfy reasonable postulates. This paper…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
The paper reviews some axioms of additivity concerning ranking methods used for generalized tournaments with possible missing values and multiple comparisons. It is shown that one of the most natural properties, called consistency, has…
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…
DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of…
Resource allocation problems across multiple contests are ubiquitous in adversarial settings, from military operations to market competition. While Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games have provided valuable theoretical foundations for…
Scoring rules measure the deviation between a probabilistic forecast and reality. Strictly proper scoring rules have the property that for any forecast, the mathematical expectation of the score of a forecast p by the lights of p is…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
We investigate differences between a simple Dominance Principle applied to sums of fair prices for variables and dominance applied to sums of forecasts for variables scored by proper scoring rules. In particular, we consider differences…
The Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the competence of some aggregate decision-making processes. In this article we explore an estimation of the prior probability of the thesis predicted…
Qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty can lead to different logical systems for formalizing such reasoning, even when the language for expressing uncertainty is the same. In the case of reasoning about…
The world of empirical machine learning (ML) strongly relies on benchmarks in order to determine the relative effectiveness of different algorithms and methods. This paper proposes the notion of "a benchmark lottery" that describes the…
Goedel's completeness theorem is concerned with provability, while Girard's theorem in ludics (as well as full completeness theorems in game semantics) are concerned with proofs. Our purpose is to look for a connection between these two…
We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of [Sanver,…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel postulate. However, we prove that certain types of quarrel…