Related papers: A minimal coalition logic
Probabilistic game structures combine both nondeterminism and stochasticity, where players repeatedly take actions simultaneously to move to the next state of the concurrent game. Probabilistic alternating simulation is an important tool to…
Coalition setting among a set of actors (countries, firms, individuals) is studied using concepts from the theory of spin glasses. Given the distribution of respective bilateral propensities to either cooperation or conflict, the phenomenon…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
We are concerned with the stability of a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings.…
Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…
We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply three successively weaker solution concepts, namely…
There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational choice. We…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain "beliefs" as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This…
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Linearizability is a commonly accepted notion of correctness for libraries of concurrent algorithms, and recent years have seen a number of proposals of program logics for proving it. Although these logics differ in technical details, they…
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…
In the following paper we present a new semantics for the well-known strategic logic ATL. It is based on adding roles to concurrent game structures, that is at every state, each agent belongs to exactly one role, and the role specifies what…
We present Coalition Logic, a three-valued modal fixed-point logic designed for declaratively specifying and reasoning about distributed algorithms, such as the Paxos consensus algorithm. Our methodology represents a distributed algorithm…
We refine a model for linear logic based on two well-known ingredients: games and simulations. We have already shown that usual simulation relations form a sound notion of morphism between games; and that we can interpret all linear logic…
The unification of logic and probability is a long-standing concern in AI, and more generally, in the philosophy of science. In essence, logic provides an easy way to specify properties that must hold in every possible world, and…
Equilibrium logic is an approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that extends the stable-model and answer-set semantics for logic programs. In particular, it includes the general case of nested logic programs, where arbitrary Boolean combinations…
Very large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 have shown the ability to handle complex tasks by generating and self-refining step-by-step rationales. Smaller language models (SLMs), typically with < 13B parameters, have been improved by…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed as autonomous agents on behalf of institutions and individuals in economic, political, and social settings that involve negotiation. Yet this trend carries significant risks if…