Related papers: A minimal coalition logic
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Coalitions are central to politics, including government formation, international relations, and public policy. Coalitions emerge when actors engage one another across multiple relational contexts, but existing literature often approaches…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
In the following paper we present a new semantics for the well-known strategic logic ATL. It is based on adding roles to concurrent game structures, that is at every state, each agent belongs to exactly one role, and the role specifies what…
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…
Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both…
Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…
Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…
We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent difficulties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have over the years led to a certain…
A logic is defined that allows to express information about statistical probabilities and about degrees of belief in specific propositions. By interpreting the two types of probabilities in one common probability space, the semantics given…
We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
Concurrent stochastic games are an important formalism for the rational verification of probabilistic multi-agent systems, which involves verifying whether a temporal logic property is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of…
We consider team semantics for propositional logic, continuing our previous work (Yang & V\"a\"an\"anen 2016). In team semantics the truth of a propositional formula is considered in a set of valuations, called a team, rather than in an…