Related papers: Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly I…
Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…
Political messages increasingly bundle economic policy arguments with moral social policy stances. Using survey experiments with roughly 6,500 U.S. adults, I show that such bundling sharply weakens economic persuasion among respondents who…
A one-dimensional interacting particle system is said to exhibit interface tightness if starting in an initial condition describing the interface between two constant configurations of different types, the process modulo translations is…
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…
Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
When does Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting with finitely many actions and states, we establish that, generically, commitment has no value if and only if a partitional experiment is optimal.…
The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that,…
In this paper we study a rational inattention model in environments where the decision maker faces uncertainty about the true prior distribution over states. The decision maker seeks to select a stochastic choice rule over a finite set of…
This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about…
Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior,…
A new agent-based, bounded-confidence model for discrete one-dimensional opinion dynamics is presented. The agents interact if their opinions do not differ more than a tolerance parameter. In pairwise interactions, one of the pair, randomly…
The Rock-Paper-Scissors(RPS) game is a paradigmatic model for cyclic dominance in biological systems. Here we consider this game in the social context of competition between opinions in a networked society. In our model, every agent has an…
This work investigates the fundamental limits of implementing network oblivious transfer via noisy multiple access channels and broadcast channels between honest-but-curious parties when the parties have access to general tripartite…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
An individual's opinion concerning political bias in the media is shaped by exogenous factors (independent analysis of media outputs) and endogenous factors (social activity, e.g. peer pressure by political allies and opponents in a…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…