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The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
Game theory provides an effective way to model strategic interactions among rational agents. In the context of formal verification, these ideas can be used to produce guarantees on the correctness of multi-agent systems, with a diverse…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…
Generating competitive strategies and performing continuous motion planning simultaneously in an adversarial setting is a challenging problem. In addition, understanding the intent of other agents is crucial to deploying autonomous systems…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
Fictitious play (FP) is a well-studied algorithm that enables agents to learn Nash equilibrium in games with certain reward structures. However, when agents have no prior knowledge of the reward functions, FP faces a major challenge: the…
Procedural generation is used across game design to achieve a wide variety of ends, and has led to the creation of several game subgenres by injecting variance, surprise or unpredictability into otherwise static designs. Information games…
A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…
Basically, in (one-player) war Real Time Strategy (wRTS) games a human player controls, in real time, an army consisting of a number of soldiers and her aim is to destroy the opponent's assets where the opponent is a virtual (i.e.,…
This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely,…
Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modelling the cost of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the…
A new class of multi-player competitive stochastic games in discrete-time with an affine specification of the redistribution of payoffs at exercise is proposed and examined. Our games cover as a very special case the classic two-person…
This paper introduces a sampling-based strategy synthesis algorithm for nondeterministic hybrid systems with complex continuous dynamics under temporal and reachability constraints. We model the evolution of the hybrid system as a…
Assistance games (also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games) have been proposed as a model for beneficial AI, wherein a robotic agent must act on behalf of a human principal but is initially uncertain about the humans…
In this chapter, we present an approach using formal methods to synthesize reactive defense strategy in a cyber network, equipped with a set of decoy systems. We first generalize formal graphical security models--attack graphs--to…
Reinforcement learning has shown much success in games such as chess, backgammon and Go. However, in most of these games, agents have full knowledge of the environment at all times. In this paper, we describe a deep learning model in which…
The holiday gift exchange game is a familiar social institution with nontrivial strategic structure. We provide a formal treatment of the game's mechanics, defining the state space, action sets, and the recursive structure of stealing…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…
We define a new concept of "mistake" strategies and actions for strategic-form and extensive-form games, analyze the relationship to prior main game-theoretic solution concepts, study algorithms for computation, and explore practicality.…