Related papers: A topological characterization of the existence of…
The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
In this paper, we establish the existence of team-optimal policies for static teams and a class of sequential dynamic teams. We first consider the static team problems and show the existence of optimal policies under certain regularity…
We generalize various notions of stability of invariant sets of dynamical systems to invariant measures, by defining a topology on the set of measures. The defined topology is similar, but not topologically equivalent to weak* topology, and…
We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of…
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve our…
We revisit the problem of existence of stable systems of contracts with arbitrary sets of contracts. We show that stable sets of contracts exists if choices of agents satisfy path-independence. We call such choice functions Plott functions.…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
Tensor-multi-scalar theories (TMST) are among the most natural generalizations of Einstein's theory, they are mathematically self-consistent and free from pathologies. They pass through all the known observations but contrary to standard…
We develop a comprehensive theory of the stable representation categories of several sequences of groups, including the classical and symmetric groups, and their relation to the unstable categories. An important component of this theory is…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
In the first edition of Classification Theory, the second author characterized the stable theories in terms of saturation of ultrapowers. Prior to this theorem, stability had already been defined in terms of counting types, and the unstable…
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph $G=(N,E)$, with an integer vertex capacity function $b$ and an edge weighting $w$. The set $N$ consists of a number of…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
Let $G$ be a graph and suppose we are given, for each $v \in V(G)$, a strict ordering of the neighbors of $v$. A set of matchings ${\cal M}$ of $G$ is called internally stable if there are no matchings $M,M' \in {\cal M}$ such that an edge…
Algorithmic stability is a central concept in statistics and learning theory that measures how sensitive an algorithm's output is to small changes in the training data. Stability plays a crucial role in understanding generalization,…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…