Related papers: State-Constrained Zero-Sum Differential Games with…

We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value) may not exist in…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…

Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…

We study online reinforcement learning in average-reward stochastic games (SGs). An SG models a two-player zero-sum game in a Markov environment, where state transitions and one-step payoffs are determined simultaneously by a learner and an…

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…

This paper studies a two-player game with a quantitative surveillance requirement on an adversarial target moving in a discrete state space and a secondary objective to maximize short-term visibility of the environment. We impose the…

In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Autonomous agents should coordinate effectively without prior knowledge of others' intents. While prior work has focused on intent inference, we address the inverse problem: how agents can strategically demonstrate their intents within…

We consider an autonomous navigation problem, whereby a traveler aims at traversing an environment in which an adversary tries to set an ambush. A two players zero sum game is introduced. Players' strategies are computed as random path…

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…

Commitments play a crucial role in game theory, shaping strategic interactions by either altering a player's own payoffs or influencing the incentives of others through outcome-contingent payments. While most research has focused on using…

Learning algorithms are essential for the applications of game theory in a networking environment. In dynamic and decentralized settings where the traffic, topology and channel states may vary over time and the communication between agents…

We consider two-player games with imperfect information and the synthesis of a randomized strategy for one player that ensures the objective is satisfied almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the other…

While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…