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We prove the existence of approximate correlated equilibrium of support size polylogarithmic in the number of players and the number of actions per player. In particular, using the probabilistic method, we show that there exists a multiset…
In this paper, we aim to design a distributed approximate algorithm for seeking Nash equilibria of an aggregative game. Due to the local set constraints of each player, projectionbased algorithms have been widely employed for solving such…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
Efficient algorithms for convex optimization, such as the ellipsoid method, require an a priori bound on the radius of a ball around the origin guaranteed to contain an optimal solution if one exists. For linear and convex quadratic…
Since the celebrated PPAD-completeness result for Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, a long line of research has focused on polynomial-time algorithms that compute $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria. Finding the best possible…
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…
We show that $\varepsilon$-additive approximations of the optimal value of fixed-size two-player free games with fixed-dimensional entanglement assistance can be computed in time $\mathrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon)$. This stands in contrast to…
While Online Gradient Descent and other no-regret learning procedures are known to efficiently converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium in games where each agent's utility is concave in their own strategy, this is not the case when…
We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant $\varepsilon>0$, obtains $\varepsilon T$-swap regret within only $T = \mathsf{polylog}(n)$ rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the…
A conceptually appealing approach for learning Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) is to convert them to Normal-Form Games (NFGs). This approach enables us to directly translate state-of-the-art techniques and analyses in NFGs to learning EFGs, but…
In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…
The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…
In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…
We propose a framework to compute approximate Nash equilibria in integer programming games with nonlinear payoffs, i.e., simultaneous and non-cooperative games where each player solves a parametrized mixed-integer nonlinear program. We…
Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…
A recent emerging trend in the literature on learning in games has been concerned with providing faster learning dynamics for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in normal-form games. Much less is known about the significantly more…