Related papers: Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Prefer…

In this paper, we study a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social networks. We consider two firms in a market competing to maximize the consumption of their products. Firms have a limited budget which can be either…

A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontier of the set of seller-buyers ex-ante utilities, generated…

We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…

We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…

We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…

This paper studies how to aggregate prosumers (or large consumers) and their collective decisions in electricity markets, with a focus on fairness. Fairness is essential for prosumers to participate in aggregation schemes. Some prosumers…

We consider the problem of constructing public facilities, such as hospitals, airports, or malls, in a country with a non-uniform population density, such that the average distance from a person's home to the nearest facility is minimized.…

The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this…

Most decision theories, including expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory, assume that investors are only interested in the distribution of returns and not in the states of the economy in which…

We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…

We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…

The Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism -- also known as the simultaneous eating algorithm -- is a canonical solution for the random assignment problem under ordinal preferences. It guarantees envy-freeness and ordinal efficiency in the…

In this work we are interested in stochastic particle methods for multi-objective optimization. The problem is formulated using parametrized, single-objective sub-problems which are solved simultaneously. To this end a consensus based…

In this article, we study the optimization of resource distributions in a one-dimensional logistic diffusive model. The goal is to determine a distribution on a bounded one-dimensional domain that maximizes the total population at…

Budgetary constraints force organizations to pursue only a subset of possible innovation projects. Identifying which subset is most promising is an error-prone exercise, and involving multiple decision makers may be prudent. This raises the…

We establish a compatibility between fairness and efficiency, captured via Nash Social Welfare (NSW), under the broad class of subadditive valuations. We prove that, for subadditive valuations, there always exists a partial allocation that…

Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium…

As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…

We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible…

We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round,…