Related papers: Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack…
We consider the problem of designing an expected-revenue maximizing mechanism for allocating multiple non-perishable goods of $k$ varieties to flexible consumers over $T$ time steps. In our model, a random number of goods of each variety…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
In this paper, we consider the classic stochastic (dynamic) knapsack problem, a fundamental mathematical model in revenue management, with general time-varying random demand. Our main goal is to study the optimal policies, which can be…
Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue optimal dynamic mechanism for a…
The problem of designing a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism with flexible consumers and costly heterogeneous supply is considered. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a…
We develop a novel mathematical programming approximation framework to tackle the stochastic knapsack problem. In this problem, the decision maker considers items for which either weights or values, or both, are random. The aim is to select…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
The stochastic knapsack has been used as a model in wide ranging applications from dynamic resource allocation to admission control in telecommunication. In recent years, a variation of the model has become a basic tool in studying problems…
This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in a quasilinear Markovian environment and analyzes a direct mechanism model of a principal-agent framework in which the agent is allowed to exit at any period. We consider that the agent's…
Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study optimal selling mechanisms for dynamic markets with stochastic supply and demand. In our model, buyers with private valuations and…
When sales of a product are affected by randomness in demand, retailers can use dynamic pricing strategies to maximise their profits. In this article the pricing problem is formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem, where the…
In E-commerce, advertising is essential for merchants to reach their target users. The typical objective is to maximize the advertiser's cumulative revenue over a period of time under a budget constraint. In real applications, an…
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite…
We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system jointly controlled by a designer and one or more agents, where the designer can influence the agents' actions through selective information disclosure. At each time step, the…
We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The…
A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…
We study a mathematical model for revenue management under competition with multiple sellers. The model combines the stochastic knapsack problem, a classic revenue management model, with a non coorperative game model that characterizes the…
We consider the 0-1 Penalized Knapsack Problem (PKP). Each item has a profit, a weight and a penalty and the goal is to maximize the sum of the profits minus the greatest penalty value of the items included in a solution. We propose an…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…