Related papers: Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack…

We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…

We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…

We study the incremental knapsack problem, where one wishes to sequentially pack items into a knapsack whose capacity expands over a finite planning horizon, with the objective of maximizing time-averaged profits. While various…

We study a dynamic and stochastic knapsack problem in which a decision maker is sequentially presented with items arriving according to a Bernoulli process over $n$ discrete time periods. Items have equal rewards and independent weights…

We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…

This paper addresses the problem of utility maximization under uncertain parameters. In contrast with the classical approach, where the parameters of the model evolve freely within a given range, we constrain them via a penalty function. We…

The stochastic knapsack problem is the stochastic variant of the classical knapsack problem in which the algorithm designer is given a a knapsack with a given capacity and a collection of items where each item is associated with a profit…

We consider the design of a revenue-optimal mechanism when two items are available to be sold to a single buyer whose valuation is uniformly distributed over an arbitrary rectangle $[c_1,c_1+b_1]\times[c_2,c_2+b_2]$ in the positive…

We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simplest case for which Myerson's characterization does not hold: a single seller selling two items, with independently distributed values, to a single additive buyer. We…

Knapsack problems are among the most fundamental problems in optimization. In the Multiple Knapsack problem, we are given multiple knapsacks with different capacities and items with values and sizes. The task is to find a subset of items of…

In this paper, we consider a multi-stage dynamic assortment optimization problem with multi-nomial choice modeling (MNL) under resource knapsack constraints. Given the current resource inventory levels, the retailer makes an assortment…

This paper analyzes a service system modeled as a single-server queue, in which the service provider aims to dynamically maximize the expected revenue per unit of time. This is achieved by constructing a stochastic gradient descent…

Two sellers compete to sell identical products to a single buyer. Each seller chooses an arbitrary mechanism, possibly involving lotteries, to sell their product. The utility-maximizing buyer can choose to participate in one or both…

This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…

We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…

In this paper, a convex optimization-based method is proposed for numerically solving dynamic programs in continuous state and action spaces. The key idea is to approximate the output of the Bellman operator at a particular state by the…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maximizes the auctioneer's revenue in a variety of single-parameter auction environments…

We consider the problem of designing a revenue-optimal mechanism in the two-item, single-buyer, unit-demand setting when the buyer's valuations, $(z_1, z_2)$, are uniformly distributed in an arbitrary rectangle $[c,c+b_1]\times[c,c+b_2]$ in…

Submodular maximization generalizes many fundamental problems in discrete optimization, including Max-Cut in directed/undirected graphs, maximum coverage, maximum facility location and marketing over social networks. In this paper we…

Time or money? That is a question! In this paper, we consider this dilemma in the pricing regime, in which we try to find the optimal pricing scheme for identical items with heterogenous time-sensitive buyers. We characterize the…