Related papers: Attraction Via Prices and Information
We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…
Ranking is a fundamental operation in information access systems, to filter information and direct user attention towards items deemed most relevant to them. Due to position bias, items of similar relevance may receive significantly…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
Securities issuance through intermediaries is subject to agency problems and informational frictions. We examine these effects using SPAC data. We identify ``premium'' investors whose participation is linked to lower liquidation risk,…
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing,…
We develop and estimate a structural model of bargaining in firm-to-firm trade to study the determinants of tariff pass-through. The model features oligopoly and oligopsony power and yields analytical expressions for bilateral markups and…
This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and…
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…
How do cost shocks pass through to prices in markets with price dispersion? We decompose the problem into two layers. In the competition layer, consumers' consideration sets determine equilibrium distributions of normalized margins. In the…
A common economic process is crowdsearch, wherein a group of agents is invited to search for a valuable physical or virtual object, e.g. creating and patenting an invention, solving an open scientific problem, or identifying vulnerabilities…
We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. We present a joint model of political influence and market competition: an oligopoly lobbies the government over regulation, and competes in the product market…
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in a model with transaction costs and price impact where two agents are incentivized to trade towards a target. The two types of frictions -- price impact and transaction costs -- lead the agents to…
Internet survey experiment is conducted to examine how providing peer information of evaluation about progressive firms changed individual's evaluations. Using large sample including over 13,000 observations collected by two-step…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already…
We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal decisions in order to acquire new information for future…
We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data…
Information foraging connects optimal foraging theory in ecology with how humans search for information. The theory suggests that, following an information scent, the information seeker must optimize the tradeoff between exploration by…
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…
The purpose of this paper is to provide a micro-economic foundation for an argument that the direct employment by the government is more desirable than the government purchase of private goods to eliminate unemployment. A general…
Pricing decisions of companies require an understanding of the causal effect of a price change on the demand. When real-life pricing experiments are infeasible, data-driven decision-making must be based on alternative data sources such as…