Related papers: Attraction Via Prices and Information

A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…

Modern commercial Internet search engines display advertisements along side the search results in response to user queries. Such sponsored search relies on market mechanisms to elicit prices for these advertisements, making use of an…

This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…

We consider a periodical equilibrium pricing problem for multiple firms over a planning horizon of T periods. At each period, firms set their selling prices and receive stochastic demand from consumers. Firms do not know their underlying…

In this paper, I introduce a profit-maximizing centralized marketplace into a decentralized market with search frictions. Agents choose between the centralized marketplace and the decentralized bilateral trade. I characterize the optimal…

Whenever customers' choices (e.g. to buy or not a given good) depend on others choices (cases coined 'positive externalities' or 'bandwagon effect' in the economic literature), the demand may be multiply valued: for a same posted price,…

Competition is a main tenet of economics, and the reason is that a perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient in the absence of externalities and public goods. Whether a product is selected in a market crucially relates to its…

We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such as those created by the government in the Affordable Care Act Exchanges or by employers when they contract with private insurers to provide plans for their employees.…

The state of economic theory and accumulated facts from the different branches of the economic science require to analyze the concept of the description of economy systems. The economic reality generates the problems the solution of that is…

This paper analyzes the strategic interactions between a profit-maximizing monopolist and a free, capacity-constrained public option. By restricting its own supply, the monopolist intentionally congests the public option and induces…

The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice.…

This paper studies a search problem where a consumer is initially aware of only a few products. At every point in time, the consumer then decides between searching among alternatives he is already aware of and discovering more products. I…

Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…

When learning is used to inform decisions about humans, such as for loans, hiring, or admissions, this can incentivize users to strategically modify their features, at a cost, to obtain positive predictions. The common assumption is that…

We study the economic interactions among sellers and buyers in online markets. In such markets, buyers have limited information about the product quality, but can observe the sellers' reputations which depend on their past transaction…

We study information elicitation in cost-function-based combinatorial prediction markets when the market maker's utility for information decreases over time. In the sudden revelation setting, it is known that some piece of information will…

Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one's preferences can require bidding on all…