Related papers: Approximating Competitive Equilibrium by Nash Welf…
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
We study the problem of allocating items to agents with submodular valuations with the goal of maximizing the weighted Nash social welfare (NSW). The best-known results for unweighted and weighted objectives are the $(4+\epsilon)$…
We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to $n$ agents to maximize the utilitarian social welfare, where the fairness criterion is envy-free up to one item and there are only two different utility functions shared by the agents. We…
This paper studies the efficiency of battery storage operations in electricity markets by comparing the social welfare gain achieved by a central planner to that of a decentralized profit-maximizing operator. The problem is formulated in a…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…
In this paper, we propose a novel class of Nash problems for Cognitive Radio (CR) networks composed of multiple primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) wherein each SU (player) competes against the others to maximize his own…
Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
In this paper, we focus on the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) which is an important and widely-used model in many different fields. In this model, subject to certain global resource constraints, a set of…
Competitive equilibrium with equal income (CEEI) is considered one of the best mechanisms to allocate a set of items among agents fairly and efficiently. In this paper, we study the computation of CEEI when items are chores that are…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model, where agents choose…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across…
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several…
This paper investigates Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems for noncooperative games over multi-players networks with finite bandwidth communication. A distributed quantized algorithm is presented, which consists of local gradient play,…