English
Related papers

Related papers: Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers

200 papers

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are decentralized applications that allow users to exchange crypto-tokens without the need for a matching exchange order. AMMs are one of the most successful DeFi use cases: indeed, major AMM platforms process…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-07-20 Massimo Bartoletti , James Hsin-yu Chiang , Alberto Lluch-Lafuente

Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-05-28 Yuhao Li , Elaine Shi , Mengqian Zhang

The asset trading volume on blockchain-based exchanges (DEX) increased substantially since the advent of Automated Market Makers (AMM). Yet, AMMs and their forks compete on the same blockchain, incurring unnecessary network and block-space…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2021-06-21 Liyi Zhou , Kaihua Qin , Arthur Gervais

As blockchains begin processing significant economic activity, the ability to include and order transactions inevitably becomes highly valuable, a concept known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). This makes effective mechanisms for…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2025-04-25 Robin Fritsch , Maria Inês Silva , Akaki Mamageishvili , Benjamin Livshits , Edward W. Felten

The always-available liquidity of automated market makers (AMMs) has been one of the most important catalysts in early cryptocurrency adoption. However, it has become increasingly evident that AMMs in their current form are not viable…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-08-10 Conor McMenamin , Vanesa Daza , Bruno Mazorra

Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs:…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2025-02-13 Austin Adams , Ciamac C. Moallemi , Sara Reynolds , Dan Robinson

We investigate the market microstructure of Automated Market Makers (AMMs), the most prominent type of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges. We show that the order execution mechanism yields token value loss for liquidity providers if…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2021-07-22 Agostino Capponi , Ruizhe Jia

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential to decentralized finance, offering continuous liquidity and enabling intermediary-free trading on blockchains. However, participants in AMMs are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-10-25 Mengqian Zhang , Sen Yang , Fan Zhang

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance. They are smart contracts (stateful programs) running on blockchains. They enable virtual token exchange: traders swap tokens with the AMM for a fee, while liquidity…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2025-09-03 Hongyin Chen , Amit Vaisman , Ittay Eyal

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring users' transactions. This paper aims to present a formal…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-06-30 Bruno Mazorra , Nicolás Della Penna

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents billions of dollars in extracted value that fundamentally shapes blockchain network dynamics and participant incentives. While research has focused on MEV extraction and mitigation, we lack…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-05-01 Andrei Seoev , Dmitry Belousov , Anastasiia Smirnova , Ksenia Kurinova , Aleksei Smirnov , Denis Fedyanin , Yury Yanovich

An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2024-01-29 Kenan Wood , Maurice Herlihy , Hammurabi Mendes , Jonad Pulaj

Automated market makers (AMMs) are one of the most prominent decentralized finance (DeFi) applications. AMMs allow users to trade different types of crypto-tokens, without the need to find a counter-party. There are several implementations…

Formal Languages and Automata Theory · Computer Science 2023-06-22 Massimo Bartoletti , James Hsin-yu Chiang , Alberto Lluch-Lafuente

An automated market maker (AMM) provides a method for creating a decentralized exchange on the blockchain. For this purpose, individual investors lend liquidity to the AMM pool in exchange for a stream of fees earned from its operations as…

Mathematical Finance · Quantitative Finance 2025-09-30 Maxim Bichuch , Zachary Feinstein

Automated market makers (AMMs) are automata that trade electronic assets at rates set by mathematical formulas. AMMs are usually implemented by smart contracts on blockchains. In practice, AMMs are often composed: and outputs from AMMs can…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2021-09-01 Daniel Engel , Maurice Herlihy

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a class of smart contracts on Ethereum and other blockchains that "make markets" autonomously. In other words, AMMs stand ready to trade with other market participants that interact with them, at the…

Mathematical Finance · Quantitative Finance 2022-12-22 Stefan Loesch

Automated market makers (AMMs) are a new prototype of decentralised exchanges which are revolutionising market interactions. The majority of AMMs are constant product markets (CPMs) where exchange rates are set by a trading function. This…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2025-06-19 Álvaro Cartea , Fayçal Drissi , Marcello Monga

We present V0LVER, an AMM protocol which solves an incentivization trilemma between users, passive liquidity providers, and block producers. V0LVER enables users and passive liquidity providers to interact without paying MEV or incurring…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-02-16 Conor McMenamin , Vanesa Daza

Maximal (also miner) extractable value, or MEV, usually refers to the value that privileged players can extract by strategically ordering, censoring, and placing transactions in a blockchain. Each blockchain network, which we refer to as a…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-08-30 Bruno Mazorra , Michael Reynolds , Vanesa Daza

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-04 Maryam Bahrani , Pranav Garimidi , Tim Roughgarden
‹ Prev 1 2 3 10 Next ›