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Related papers: Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers

200 papers

The evolution of blockchain technology, from its origins as a decentralized ledger for cryptocurrencies to its broader applications in areas like decentralized finance (DeFi), has significantly transformed financial ecosystems while…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-03-04 Daniil Vostrikov , Yash Madhwal , Andrey Seoev , Anastasiia Smirnova , Yury Yanovich , Alexey Smirnov , Vladimir Gorgadze

We develop a formalism for reasoning about trading on decentralized exchanges on blockchains and a formulation of a particular form of maximal extractable value (MEV) that represents the total arbitrage opportunity extractable from on-chain…

Mathematical Finance · Quantitative Finance 2023-04-24 Alan Guo

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is value extractable by temporary monopoly power commonly found in decentralized systems. This extraction stems from a lack of user privacy upon transaction submission and the ability of a monopolist…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-09-26 Tarun Chitra

In this paper, we take a close look at a problem labeled maximal extractable value (MEV), which arises in a blockchain due to the ability of a block producer to manipulate the order of transactions within a block. Indeed, blockchains such…

General Economics · Economics 2024-03-29 Vijay Mohan , Peyman Khezr

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering users' transactions to maximize fees or from inserting new…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-05-02 Kshitij Kulkarni , Theo Diamandis , Tarun Chitra

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-05-16 Yifan Mao , Mengya Zhang , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Zhiqiang Lin

Trading through decentralized exchanges (DEXs) has become crucial in today's blockchain ecosystem, enabling users to swap tokens efficiently and automatically. However, the capacity of miners to strategically order transactions has led to…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-09-25 Yuhao Li , Mengqian Zhang , Jichen Li , Elynn Chen , Xi Chen , Xiaotie Deng

Blockchains offer strong security guarantees, but they cannot protect the ordering of transactions. Powerful players, such as miners, sequencers, and sophisticated bots, can reap significant profits by selectively including, excluding, or…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-10-24 Sen Yang , Fan Zhang , Ken Huang , Xi Chen , Youwei Yang , Feng Zhu

We study a novel automated market maker design: the function maximizing AMM (FM-AMM). Our central assumption is that trades are batched before execution. Because of competition between arbitrageurs, the FM-AMM eliminates arbitrage profits…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2025-02-20 Andrea Canidio , Robin Fritsch

Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-05-01 Sen Yang , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang

MEV attacks have been an omnipresent evil in the blockchain world, an implicit tax that uninformed users pay for using the service. The problem arises from the miners' ability to reorder and insert arbitrary transactions in the blocks they…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-11-29 Dev Churiwala , Bhaskar Krishnamachari

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol design space. Our aim is to leverage this parameter to…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-10-02 Pedro Braga , Georgios Chionas , Piotr Krysta , Stefanos Leonardos , Georgios Piliouras , Carmine Ventre

Designing automated market makers (AMMs) is crucial for decentralized token exchanges in cryptoeconomic systems. At the intersection of software engineering and economics, AMM design is complex and, if done incorrectly, can lead to…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2025-03-24 Daniel Kirste , Niclas Kannengießer , Ricky Lamberty , Ali Sunyaev

As an integral part of the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, decentralized exchanges (DEXs) with automated market maker (AMM) protocols have gained massive traction with the recently revived interest in blockchain and distributed…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2023-03-16 Jiahua Xu , Krzysztof Paruch , Simon Cousaert , Yebo Feng

The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-02-08 Sankarshan Damle , Varul Srivastava , Sujit Gujar

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) drives the prosperity of the blockchain ecosystem. By strategically including, excluding, or reordering transactions within blocks, block producers can extract additional value, which in turn incentivizes…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-10-11 Tianyang Chi , Ningyu He , Xiaohui Hu , Haoyu Wang

Batch auctions are a classical market microstructure, acclaimed for their fairness properties, and have received renewed interest in the context of blockchain-based financial systems. Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are another…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-06-24 Geoffrey Ramseyer , Mohak Goyal , Ashish Goel , David Mazières

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are an integral component of the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, as they allow users to exchange crypto-assets without the need for trusted authorities or external price oracles. Although these…

Logic in Computer Science · Computer Science 2024-02-13 Daniele Pusceddu , Massimo Bartoletti

Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , David C. Parkes