Related papers: Average-Case Analysis of Iterative Voting
In search engines, online marketplaces and other human-computer interfaces large collectives of individuals sequentially interact with numerous alternatives of varying quality. In these contexts, trial and error (exploration) is crucial for…
We discuss a novel microscopic model for collective decision-making interacting multi-agent systems. In particular we are interested in modeling a well known phenomena in the experimental literature called equality bias, where agents tend…
We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the…
When building statistical models for Bayesian data analysis tasks, required and optional iterative adjustments and different modelling choices can give rise to numerous candidate models. In particular, checks and evaluations throughout the…
With Artificial Intelligence systems increasingly applied in consequential domains, researchers have begun to ask how these systems ought to act in ethically charged situations where even humans lack consensus. In the Moral Machine project,…
We investigate opinion dynamics in multi-agent networks when a bias toward one of two possible opinions exists; for example, reflecting a status quo vs a superior alternative. Starting with all agents sharing an initial opinion representing…
In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal…
We introduce the incremental voter model (IVM), a discrete-opinion multi-agent system where agents undergo step-wise transitions biased by the opinion of a randomly selected persuader. Our incremental voter model comprises a large…
In consumer search, there is a set of items. An agent has a prior over her value for each item and can pay a cost to learn the instantiation of her value. After exploring a subset of items, the agent chooses one and obtains a payoff equal…
Most analyses of manipulation of voting schemes have adopted two assumptions that greatly diminish their practical import. First, it is usually assumed that the manipulators have full knowledge of the votes of the nonmanipulating agents.…
The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We…
The major finding, of this article, is an ensemble method, but more exactly, a novel, better ranked voting system (and other variations of it), that aims to solve the problem of finding the best candidate to represent the voters. We have…
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility…
When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the…
How should one combine noisy information from diverse sources to make an inference about an objective ground truth? This frequently recurring, normative question lies at the core of statistics, machine learning, policy-making, and everyday…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
We study binary opinion dynamics in a fully connected network of interacting agents. The agents are assumed to interact according to one of the following rules: (1) Voter rule: An updating agent simply copies the opinion of another randomly…
Analyses of voting algorithms often overlook informational externalities shaping individual votes. For example, pre-polling information often skews voters towards candidates who may not be their top choice, but who they believe would be a…
Human interactions are influenced by emotions, temperament, and affection, often conflicting with individuals' underlying preferences. Without explicit knowledge of those preferences, judging whether behaviour is appropriate becomes…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…