Related papers: Markovian Analysis of Information Cascades with Fa…
In online markets, agents often learn from other's actions in addition to their private information. Such observational learning can lead to herding or information cascades in which agents eventually ignore their private information and…
An information cascade is a circumstance where agents make decisions in a sequential fashion by following other agents. Bikhchandani et al., predict that once a cascade starts it continues, even if it is wrong, until agents receive an…
It is well known that sequential decision making may lead to information cascades. That is, when agents make decisions based on their private information, as well as observing the actions of those before them, then it might be rational to…
Transmission of disease, spread of information and rumors, adoption of new products, and many other network phenomena can be fruitfully modeled as cascading processes, where actions chosen by nodes influence the subsequent behavior of…
We consider an environment where players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is unknown to the players. Instead, each player has her own…
We study how fads emerge under social learning in a changing environment. We consider a simple sequential social learning model where rational agents arrive in order, each acting only once, and the underlying unknown state constantly…
In social networks, information and influence diffuse among users as cascades. While the importance of studying cascades has been recognized in various applications, it is difficult to observe the complete structure of cascades in practice.…
We study the pairwise bounded confidence model on scale-free networks where new agents regularly arrive over time. The probability that arriving agents form links to preexisting ones depends on both agent degree and opinion proximity. In…
We study sequential social learning with continuous actions and conformity when agents can endogenously generate hard, publicly verifiable evidence. Actions transmit soft information whose visibility depends on responsiveness to private…
In this paper, we study information cascades on graphs. In this setting, each node in the graph represents a person. One after another, each person has to take a decision based on a private signal as well as the decisions made by earlier…
We analyze a sequential decision making model in which decision makers (or, players) take their decisions based on their own private information as well as the actions of previous decision makers. Such decision making processes often lead…
Research on information diffusion generally assumes complete knowledge of the underlying network. However, in the presence of factors such as increasing privacy awareness, restrictions on application programming interfaces (APIs) and…
We study a tractable opinion dynamics model that generates long-run disagreements and persistent opinion fluctuations. Our model involves an inhomogeneous stochastic gossip process of continuous opinion dynamics in a society consisting of…
We study the problem of an agent continuously faced with the decision of placing or not placing trust in an institution. The agent makes use of Bayesian learning in order to estimate the institution's true trustworthiness and makes the…
Information cascades, effectively facilitated by most social network platforms, are recognized as a major factor in almost every social success and disaster in these networks. Can cascades be predicted? While many believe that they are…
In this work, we study the consensus problem in which legitimate agents send their values over an undirected communication network in the presence of an unknown subset of malicious or faulty agents. In contrast to former works, we…
Collective behavior in online social media and networks is known to be capable of generating non-intuitive dynamics associated with crowd wisdom and herd behaviour. Even though these topics have been well-studied in social science, the…
We consider a group of agents who can each take an irreversible costly action whose payoff depends on an unknown state. Agents learn about the state from private signals, as well as from past actions of their social network neighbors, which…
In this work, we are interested in finding the most efficient use of a budget to promote an opinion by paying agents within a group to supplant their true opinions. We model opinions as continuous scalars ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0)…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…