Related papers: Symbolic Computation of Sequential Equilibria
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in extensive-form games, while its efficient computation is still far from straightforward. This paper considers finite $n$-player extensive-form games with perfect recall under the…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
A central task of artificial intelligence is the design of artificial agents that act towards specified goals in partially observed environments. Since such environments frequently include interaction over time with other agents with their…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium. It actually yields Nash equilibria that define a proper subclass of…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Symmetries play an critical role in finding analytic solutions to nonlinear differential equations. A symmetry is a mapping of the solutions of the differential equation into the solutions and have been studied extensively for over a…
It is a well-known fact that correlated equilibria can be computed in polynomial time in a large class of concisely represented games using the celebrated Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Jiang and…
Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria…
We present a robust framework with computational algorithms to support decision makers in sequential games. Our framework includes methods to solve games with complete information, assess the robustness of such solutions and, finally,…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…
Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…
We propose efficient no-regret learning dynamics and ellipsoid-based methods for computing linear correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$a relaxation of correlated equilibria and a strengthening of coarse correlated…
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…