Related papers: A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Vo…
When confronted with a host of issues, groups often save time and energy by compiling many issues into a single bundle when making decisions. This reduces the time and cost of group decision-making, but it also leads to suboptimal outcomes…
Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, ...), control (by adding or deleting voters or candidates), lobbying in referenda and…
A hybrid model for opinion dynamics in complex multi-agent networks is introduced, wherein some continuous-valued agents average neighbors' opinions to update their own, while other discrete-valued agents use stochastic copying and voting…
Cumulative and quadratic voting are two distributional voting methods that are expressive, promoting fairness and inclusion, particularly in the realm of participatory budgeting. Despite these benefits, graphical voter interfaces for…
Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
We study the complexity of deciding whether there is a tie in a given approval-based multiwinner election, as well as the complexity of counting tied winning committees. We consider a family of Thiele rules, their greedy variants,…
We introduces a general linear framework that unifies the study of multi-winner voting rules and proportionality axioms, demonstrating that many prominent multi-winner voting rules-including Thiele methods, their sequential variants, and…
We study a generalization of the voter model on complex networks, focusing on the scaling of mean exit time. Previous work has defined the voter model in terms of an initially chosen node and a randomly chosen neighbor, which makes it…
The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…
In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their…
In boosting, we aim to leverage multiple weak learners to produce a strong learner. At the center of this paradigm lies the concept of building the strong learner as a voting classifier, which outputs a weighted majority vote of the weak…
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that…
Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…
We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are…
In high-dimensional data analysis, bi-level sparsity is often assumed when covariates function group-wisely and sparsity can appear either at the group level or within certain groups. In such cases, an ideal model should be able to…
We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the $\mathcal{R}$-Multi-Bribery problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the perturbed election under the voting rule…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
We consider a setting with agents that have preferences over alternatives and are partitioned into disjoint districts. The goal is to choose one alternative as the winner using a mechanism which first decides a representative alternative…
Effective group decision-making is critical in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Yet, how different mechanisms for reaching consensus impact collaboration quality and efficiency remains understudied. We conduct a systematic study on group…