Related papers: Multiple equilibria in mean-field game models for …
We propose a mean field game (MFG) framework to model the evolution of renewable energy production in competitive electricity markets. Producers interact through the spot price while optimising their profits under production, installation,…
This paper studies a mean field game inspired by crowd motion in which agents evolve in a compact domain and want to reach its boundary minimizing the sum of their travel time and a given boundary cost. Interactions between agents occur…
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
We consider a market where a finite number of players trade an asset whose supply is a stochastic process. The price formation problem consists of finding a price process that ensures that when agents act optimally to minimize their trading…
A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…
We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…
In this paper, we consider mean-field games where the interaction of each player with the mean-field takes into account not only the states of the players but also their collective behavior, To do so, we develop a random variable framework…
This paper establishes the existence of equilibria result of a class of mean field games with singular controls. The interaction takes place through both states and controls. A relaxed solution approach is used. To circumvent the tightness…
In this article, we introduce a new class of entropy-penalized robust mean field game problems in which the representative agent is opposed to Nature. The agent's objective is formulated as a min-max stochastic control problem, in which…
This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…
The evolution of existing transportation systems,mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and…
In this study, we analyze an advertising competition in a duopoly. We consider two different notions of equilibrium. We model the companies in the duopoly as major players, and the consumers as minor players. In our first game model we…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of…
In a game theoretic framework, we study energy markets with a continuum of homogenous producers who produce energy from an exhaustible resource such as oil. Each producer simultaneously optimizes production rate that drives her revenues, as…