Related papers: On egalitarian values for cooperative games with l…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…
This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…
A large branch of explainable machine learning is grounded in cooperative game theory. However, research indicates that game-theoretic explanations may mislead or be hard to interpret. We argue that often there is a critical mismatch…
One of the practical applications of cooperative transferable utility games involves determining the fee structure for users of a given facility, whose construction or maintenance costs need to be recouped. In this context, certain…
The Owen value is an well-known allocation rule for cooperative games with coalition structure.In this paper, we introduce the concept of highly mutually dependent unions. Two unions in a cooperative game with coalition structure are said…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player's marginal contribution - a central…
In a combinatorial exchange setting, players place sell (resp. buy) bids on combinations of traded goods. Besides the question of finding an optimal selection of winning bids, the question of how to share the obtained profit is of high…
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…
What is the value of an individual model in an ensemble of binary classifiers? We answer this question by introducing a class of transferable utility cooperative games called \textit{ensemble games}. In machine learning ensembles,…
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One…
This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a group of agents, while maintaining stability in the sense of the core constraints of a cooperative transferable utility game, or TU game.…
We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…
In networking and computing, resource allocation is typically addressed using classical sharing protocols as, for instance, the proportional division rule, the max-min fair allocation , or other solutions inspired by cooperative game…
This paper extends the theory of subset team games, a generalization of cooperative game theory requiring a payoff function that is defined for all subsets of players. This subset utility is used to define both altruistic and selfish…
According to Shapley's game-theoretical result, there exists a unique game value of finite cooperative games that satisfies axioms on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The original setting requires symmetry with…