Related papers: On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a…
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures. In the case of the equal…
Several extensions of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value to the family of games with a priori unions are proposed in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2020) ``On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability…
We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…
We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…
In this paper we introduce the $\Gamma$ value, a new value for cooperative games with transferable utility. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the $\Gamma$ value based on a property concerning the so-called necessary players.…
This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic…
The Owen value is an well-known allocation rule for cooperative games with coalition structure.In this paper, we introduce the concept of highly mutually dependent unions. Two unions in a cooperative game with coalition structure are said…
In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…
We introduce a new allocation rule, the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), for cooperative games whose characteristic function is incomplete. The UD-value assigns payoffs by distributing the total surplus of each family of indistinguishable…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores). For goods the Competitive division fares better, as it is Resource…