Related papers: Herd Behaviour in Public Goods Games
This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…
Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the "leading-eight" strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining…
The evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the…
Established already in the Biblical times, the Matthew effect stands for the fact that in societies rich tend to get richer and the potent even more powerful. Here we investigate a game theoretical model describing the evolution of…
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…
This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…
Recent paradigm shifts from imitation learning to reinforcement learning (RL) is shown to be productive in understanding human behaviors. In the RL paradigm, individuals search for optimal strategies through interaction with the environment…
Understanding and resolving cooperation dilemmas are key challenges in evolutionary game theory, which have revealed several mechanisms to address them. This paper investigates the comprehensive influence of multiple reputation-related…
Ingroup favoritism, the tendency to favor ingroup over outgroup, is often explained as a product of intergroup conflict, or correlations between group tags and behavior. Such accounts assume that group membership is meaningful, whereas…
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation…
We model an electorate voting on the funding of a public good in a two-party system in an evolutionary game theory framework. Voters adopt one of four strategies: Consensus-makers, Gridlockers, Party 1 Zealots, and Party 2 Zealots, which…
Cooperation in heterogeneous groups, where individuals differ in resources, productivity, and behavioural responsiveness, underpins collective action across many social and biological systems. Introspection dynamics, in which each player…
The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
Shared resources enhance productivity yet at the same time provide channels for biological and digital contamination, turning physical or digital hygiene into a cooperation dilemma prone to free-riding. Here we introduce a game of…
It is a challenging task to reach global cooperation among self-interested agents, which often requires sophisticated design or usage of incentives. For example, we may apply supervisors or referees who are able to detect and punish…
Understanding cooperation in social systems is challenging because the ever-changing rules that govern societies interact with individual actions, resulting in intricate collective outcomes. In virtual-world experiments, we allowed people…
This paper deals with grouping of entities in a fleet based on their behavior. The behavior of each entity is characterized by its historical dataset, which comprises a dependent variable, typically a performance measure, and multiple…
The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into human group settings raises essential questions about how these novel participants influence cooperative social norms. While previous studies on human-AI cooperation have…
In a static environment, optional participation and a local agglomeration of cooperators are found to be beneficial for the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation. In the optional public goods game, the rock-scissors-paper cycles of…