Related papers: Popularity in location games
In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a restricted neighborhood, each client randomly picks one attractive agent for service. Two utility…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…
The Hotelling-Downs model is a natural and appealing model for understanding strategic positioning by candidates in elections. In this model, voters are distributed on a line, representing their ideological position on an issue. Each…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…
We discuss long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents. In particular, three-player spatial games are studied. The effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria is…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…
We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many…
We develop a probabilistic consumer choice framework based on information asymmetry between consumers and firms. This framework makes it possible to study market competition of several firms by both quality and price of their products. We…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
The paper deals with a class of parametrized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational inequality of the…
In this paper, we investigate the effect of brand in market competition. Specifically, we propose a variant Hotelling model where companies and customers are represented by points in an Euclidean space, with axes being product features. $N$…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…
We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…
The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest server. In this…