Related papers: Auctions and mass transportation
We completely characterise the optimal solutions for the three-marginal optimal transport problem - introduced in [K. Bolbotowski, G. Bouchitt\'e, Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality theory for the Hessian, 2024, preprint], and whose relaxation…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using…
We introduce an extension of the Optimal Transport problem when multiple costs are involved. Considering each cost as an agent, we aim to share equally between agents the work of transporting one distribution to another. To do so, we…
Myerson's seminal characterization of the revenue-optimal auction for a single item \cite{myerson1981optimal} remains a cornerstone of mechanism design. However, generalizing this framework to multi-item settings has proven exceptionally…
In this paper we analyze a mass transportation problem in a bounded domain with the possibility to transport mass to/from the boundary, paying the transport cost, that is given by the Euclidean distance plus an extra cost depending on the…
Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…
A measure theoretical approach is presented to study the Monge-Kantorovich optimal mass transport problem. This approach together with Kantorovich duality provide an effective tool to answer a long standing question about the support of…
We consider the pricing problem facing a seller of a contingent claim. We assume that this seller has some general level of partial information, and that he is not allowed to sell short in certain assets. This pricing problem, which is our…
We review two models of optimal transport, where congestion effects during the transport can be possibly taken into account. The first model is Beckmann's one, where the transport activities are modeled by vector fields with given…
Consider a transportation problem with sets of sources and sinks. There are profits and prices on the edges. The goal is to maximize the profit while meeting the following constraints; the total flow going out of a source must not exceed…
We consider a Beckmann formulation of an unbalanced optimal transport (UOT) problem. The $\Gamma$-convergence of this formulation of UOT to the corresponding optimal transport (OT) problem is established as the balancing parameter $\alpha$…
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
Many results in probability (most famously, Strassen's theorem on stochastic domination), characterize some relationship between probability distributions in terms of the existence of a particular structured coupling between them. Optimal…
Ridesharing and ridesourcing services have become widespread, and pricing the rides is a crucial problem for these systems. We propose and analyze a budget-balanced and strategy-proof auction, the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) auction, for…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the profit of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSP's advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly flexible and can be…