Related papers: Auctions and mass transportation
Motivated by applications to geometric inequalities, Gozlan, Roberto, Samson, and Tetali introduced a transport problem for `weak' cost functionals. Basic results of optimal transport theory can be extended to this setup in remarkable…
This article studies problems of optimal transport, by embedding them in a general functional analytic framework of convex optimization. This provides a unified treatment of a large class of related problems in probability theory and allows…
We provide a unifying interpretation of various optimal transport problems as a minimisation of a linear functional over the set of all Choquet representations of a given pair of probability measures ordered with respect to a certain convex…
We investigate duality and existence of dual optimizers for several adapted optimal transport problems under minimal assumptions. This includes the causal and bicausal transport, the causal and bicausal barycenter problem, and a…
The classical Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality theorem establishes a significant connection between Monge optimal transport and maximization of a linear form on the set of 1-Lipschitz functions. This result has been widely used in various…
We study the optimal behavior of a bidder in a real-time auction subject to the requirement that a specified collections of heterogeneous items be acquired within given time constraints. The problem facing this bidder is cast as a…
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…
Auctions are important mechanisms extensively implemented in various markets, e.g., search engines' keyword auctions, antique auctions, etc. Finding an optimal auction mechanism is extremely difficult due to the constraints of imperfect…
The classical duality theory of Kantorovich and Kellerer for the classical optimal transport is generalized to an abstract framework and a characterization of the dual elements is provided. This abstract generalization is set in a Banach…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers [HN12], and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand bidders…
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm…
This paper develops the theory of mechanism redesign by which an auctioneer can reoptimize an auction based on bid data collected from previous iterations of the auction on bidders from the same market. We give a direct method for…
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…