Related papers: Cost Minimization for Equilibrium Transition
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In…
In this work we study of competitive situations among users of a set of global resources. More precisely we study the effect of cost policies used by these resources in the convergence time to a pure Nash equilibrium. The work is divided in…
While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
In this paper, we consider the problem of wireless power control in an interference channel where transmitters aim to maximize their own benefit. When the individual payoff or utility function is derived from the transmission efficiency and…
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
We consider a class of games with continuum of players where equilibria can be obtained by the minimization of a certain functional related to optimal transport as emphasized in [7]. We then use the powerful entropic regularization…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players $n$. Our main result states that for $n$-player binary-action games and for constant $\varepsilon$, the query complexity of an…
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not…
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…
An heuristic approach to compute strong Nash (Aumann) equilibria is presented. The method is based on differential evolution and three variants of a generative relation for strong Nash equilibria characterization. Numerical experiments…
We consider a tournament among four equally strong semifinalists. The players have to decide how much stamina to use in the semifinals, provided that the rest is available in the final and the third-place playoff. We investigate optimal…