Related papers: A Golden-Free Formal Method for Trojan Detection i…
Training machine learning models can be very expensive or even unaffordable. This may be, for example, due to data limitations, such as unavailability or being too large, or computational power limitations. Therefore, it is a common…
Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…
The availability of wide-ranging third-party intellectual property (3PIP) cores enables integrated circuit (IC) designers to focus on designing high-level features in ASICs/SoCs. The massive proliferation of ICs brings with it an increased…
In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis (LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution, unlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural Network to…
Trojan attack on deep neural networks, also known as backdoor attack, is a typical threat to artificial intelligence. A trojaned neural network behaves normally with clean inputs. However, if the input contains a particular trigger, the…
Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramount importance for…
Neural networks can conceal malicious Trojan backdoors that allow a trigger to covertly change the model behavior. Detecting signs of these backdoors, particularly without access to any triggered data, is the subject of ongoing research and…
This paper utilizes Reinforcement Learning (RL) as a means to automate the Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion process to eliminate the inherent human biases that limit the development of robust HT detection methods. An RL agent explores the…
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) provide profitable surfaces for hardware attacks such as hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans can implement stealthy attacks such as leaking critical information, taking control of devices or harm humans. In this…
Always-on hardware Trojans pose a serious challenge to integrated circuit trust, as they remain active during normal operation and are difficult to detect in post-deployment settings without trusted golden references. This paper presents a…
As modern hardware designs grow in complexity and size, ensuring security across the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad becomes increasingly challenging. Information flow tracking (IFT) is a widely-used approach to…
Modern IoT and embedded platforms must start execution from a known trusted state to thwart malware, ensure secure firmware updates, and protect critical infrastructure. Current approaches to establish a root of trust depend on secret keys…
Verifying the security of masked hardware and software implementations, under advanced leakage models, remains a significant challenge, especially then accounting for glitches, transitions and CPU micro-architectural specifics. Existing…
In hardware accelerators used in data centers and safety-critical applications, soft errors and resultant silent data corruption significantly compromise reliability, particularly when upsets occur in control-flow operations, leading to…
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in digital designs that can be inserted by untrusted supply chain entities. Hardware Trojans can give rise to diverse attack vectors such as information leakage (e.g. MOLES Trojan) and…
Recently, it has been shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to Trojan attacks, where an attacker can install a backdoor during training time to make the resultant model misidentify samples contaminated with a small trigger patch.…
True random number generators (TRNGs) are essential components of cryptographic designs, which are used to generate private keys for encryption and authentication, and are used in masking countermeasures. In this work, we present a…
Security graphs model attacks, defenses, mitigations, and vulnerabilities on computer networks and systems. With proper attributes, they provide security metrics using standard graph algorithms. A hyperflow graph is a register-transfer…
Formal verification of floating-point arithmetic remains challenging due to non-linear arithmetic behavior and the tight coupling between control and datapath logic. Existing approaches often rely on high-level C models for equivalence…
Threat detection systems rely on rule-based logic to identify adversarial behaviors, yet the conformance of these rules to high-level threat models is rarely verified formally. We present a formal verification framework that models both…