Related papers: Revealing Sequential Rationality and Forward Induc…
Voting by sequential elimination is a low-communication voting protocol: voters play in sequence and eliminate one or more of the remaining candidates, until only one remains. While the fairness and efficiency of such protocols have been…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…
The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…
Sequential reasoning is a complex human ability, with extensive previous research focusing on gaming AI in a single continuous game, round-based decision makings extending to a sequence of games remain less explored. Counter-Strike: Global…
There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational choice. We…
In decentralized stochastic control (or stochastic team theory) and game theory, if there is a pre-defined order in a system in which agents act, the system is called \textit{sequential}, otherwise it is non-sequential. Much of the…
Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both…
This paper studies sequential quantum games under the assumption that the moves of the players are drawn from groups and not just plain sets. The extra group structure makes possible to easily derive some very general results characterizing…
Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
We consider the problem of computing the set of initial states of a dynamical system such that there exists a control strategy to ensure that the trajectories satisfy a temporal logic specification with probability 1 (almost-surely). We…
We study the relationship between invariant transformations on extensive game structures and backward dominance procedure (BD), a generalization of the classical backward induction introduced in Perea (2014). We show that behavioral…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
The dynamics in games involving multiple players, who adaptively learn from their past experience, is not yet well understood. We analyzed a class of stochastic games with Markov strategies in which players choose their actions…
Future sequence represents the outcome after executing the action into the environment (i.e. the trajectory onwards). When driven by the information-theoretic concept of mutual information, it seeks maximally informative consequences.…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
The Ordinal Folding Index (OFI) is a new, fully computable yard-stick that measures how many rounds of self-reference a statement, protocol or position must unfold before its truth or outcome stabilises. By turning this abstract 'fold-back'…
We consider a stochastic differential game in the context of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, where one player implements an impulse control while the opponent controls the system continuously. Utilizing the notion of…
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…