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Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…
The present paper gives a mathematical, in particular, syntax-independent, formulation of intensionality and dynamics of computation in terms of games and strategies. Specifically, we give a game semantics for a higher-order programming…
An algorithm based on backward induction is devised in order to compute the optimal sequence of games to be played in Parrondo games. The algorithm can be used to find the optimal sequence for any finite number of turns or in the steady…
The game theoretic concepts of rationalizability and iterated dominance are closely related and provide characterizations of each other. Indeed, the equivalence between them implies that in a two player finite game, the remaining set of…
Game semantics extends the Curry-Howard isomorphism to a three-way correspondence: proofs, programs, strategies. But the universe of strategies goes beyond intuitionistic logics and lambda calculus, to capture stateful programs. In this…
Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The common approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing expected…
Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated.…
Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of…
We consider 2-player games played on a finite state space for infinite rounds. The games are concurrent: in each round, the two players choose their moves simultaneously; the current state and the moves determine the successor. We consider…
Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and…
This paper introduces an evolutionary dynamics based on imitate the better realization (IBR) rule. Under this rule, agents in a population game imitate the strategy of a randomly chosen opponent whenever the opponent`s realized payoff is…
This work addresses competitive resource allocation in a sequential setting, where two players allocate resources across objects or locations of shared interest. Departing from the simultaneous Colonel Blotto game, our framework introduces…
Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces…
Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…
In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub-reactive strategies.…
Autonomous systems are increasingly expected to operate in the presence of adversaries, though adversaries may infer sensitive information simply by observing a system. Therefore, present a deceptive sequential decision-making framework…
The recent years have seen interest into the possibility for (classical as well as quantum) causal structures that, while remaining logically consistent, feature a cyclic causal order between events, opening intriguing possibilities for new…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…