Related papers: Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules
Selecting the combination of security controls that will most effectively protect a system's assets is a difficult task. If the wrong controls are selected, the system may be left vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can impact the…
We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the rare resources. In the area of security, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive number of targets is especially challenging. This paper addresses this resource allocation…
Network games study the strategic interaction of agents connected through a network. Interventions in such a game -- actions a coordinator or planner may take that change the utility of the agents and thus shift the equilibrium action…
In this paper, we propose a method to develop trustworthy reinforcement learning systems. To ensure safety especially during exploration, we automatically synthesize a correct-by-construction runtime enforcer, called a shield, that blocks…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
This paper studies a variant of the multi-player reach-avoid game played between intruders and defenders with applications to perimeter defense. The intruder team tries to score by sending as many intruders as possible to the target area,…
Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even…
Ensuring public safety in a Smart City (SC) environment is a critical and increasingly complicated task due to the involvement of multiple agencies and the city's expansion across cyber and social layers. In this paper, we propose an…
Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their \textbf{reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions}. In this paper, we…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
Stackelberg planning is a recently introduced single-turn two-player adversarial planning model, where two players are acting in a joint classical planning task, the objective of the first player being hampering the second player from…
We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…
In increasingly different contexts, it happens that a human player has to interact with artificial players who make decisions following decision-making algorithms. How should the human player play against these algorithms to maximize his…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the…