Related papers: Characterising and Verifying the Core in Concurren…

In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…

The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation lies in the core of the game if, for each sub-coalition, the…

LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of the core, right from its early days to the present time. However, despite the extensive nature of this work, basic gaps still remain. We address these gaps using the following…

We fully characterize the core of a broad class of nonlinear games by identifying a suitable relaxation for inherent nonlinearity, directly generalizing the linear frameworks in the literature. This characterization significantly expands…

Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…

We introduce the novel notion of winning cores in parity games and develop a deterministic polynomial-time under-approximation algorithm for solving parity games based on winning core approximation. Underlying this algorithm are a number…

This paper proposes a novel algorithm to approximate the core of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games via linear programming. Given the computational hardness of determining the full core, our approach provides a tractable…

Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…

In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…

The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…

The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…

Cooperative 2-matching games are a generalization of cooperative matching games, where the value function is given by maximum-weight b-matchings, for a vertex capacity vector $b \leq 2$. We show how to separate over the core of 2-matching…

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…

We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…

Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a…

Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network…

Many high-stakes decision-making problems, such as those found within cybersecurity and economics, can be modeled as competitive resource allocation games. In these games, multiple players must allocate limited resources to overcome their…

Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game…