Related papers: Serial Monopoly on Blockchains
This paper studies the optimal transaction fee mechanisms for blockchains, focusing on the distinction between price-based ($\mathcal{P}$) and quantity-based ($\mathcal{Q}$) controls. By analyzing factors such as demand uncertainty,…
A monopolist wants to sell one item per period to a consumer with evolving and persistent private information. The seller sets a price each period depending on the history so far, but cannot commit to future prices. We show that, regardless…
Supply chain applications operate in a multi-stakeholder setting, demanding trust, provenance, and transparency. Blockchain technology provides mechanisms to establish a decentralized infrastructure involving multiple stakeholders. Such…
The first generation of blockchain focused on digital currencies and secure storage, management and transfer of tokenized values. Thereafter, the focus has been shifting from currencies to a broader application space. In this paper, we…
Blockchains are distributed data structures that are used to achieve consensus in systems for cryptocurrencies (like Bitcoin) or smart contracts (like Ethereum). Although blockchains gained a lot of popularity recently, there is no…
There appears to be an insatiable desire for spawning new bespoke blockchains to harness the functionality provided by blockchain technologies, resulting in a constant stream of blockchain start-up companies entering the market with their…
In Proof-of-Work blockchains, difficulty algorithms serve the crucial purpose of maintaining a stable transaction throughput by dynamically adjusting the block difficulty in response to the miners' constantly changing computational power.…
This paper proposes a random network model for blockchains, a distributed hierarchical data structure of blocks that has found several applications in various industries. The model is parametric on two probability distribution functions…
We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput blockchains or Web 3.0…
We study blockchain trade-intent auctions, which currently intermediate about USD 10 billion in trades each month. These auctions are combinatorial because executing multiple trade intents jointly generates additional efficiencies. However,…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…
A blockchain is a database of sequential events that is maintained by a distributed group of nodes. A key consensus problem in blockchains is that of determining the next block (data element) in the sequence. Many blockchains address this…
In an electric power system, demand fluctuations may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers. Furthermore, in the near future, deep penetration of volatile renewable electricity generation is expected to exacerbate the variability…
Proof-of-Stake systems randomly choose, on each round, one of the participants as a consensus leader that extends the chain with the next block such that the selection probability is proportional to the owned stake. However, distributed…
The development of blockchain technologies has enabled the trustless execution of so-called smart contracts, i.e. programs that regulate the exchange of assets (e.g., cryptocurrency) between users. In a decentralized blockchain, the state…
As distributed ledgers, blockchains run consensus protocols which trade capacity for consistency, especially in non-ideal networks with incomplete connectivity and erroneous links. Existing studies on the tradeoff between capacity and…
We consider users which may have renewable energy harvesting devices, or distributed generators. Such users can behave as consumer or producer (hence, we denote them as prosumers) at different time instances. A prosumer may sell the energy…
Personal IoT data is a new economic asset that individuals can trade to generate revenue on the emerging data marketplaces. Typically, marketplaces are centralized systems that raise concerns of privacy, single point of failure, little…
An emerging blockchain protocol design pattern leverages the asymmetry between the computational effort in performing versus verifying tasks. For example, cryptographic validity proofs (e.g., SNARKS) require the prover to expend significant…