Related papers: $\varepsilon$-fractional Core Stability in Hedonic…
Lately, the energy communities have gained a lot of attention as they have the potential to significantly contribute to the resilience and flexibility of the energy system, facilitating widespread integration of intermittent renewable…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…
Coalition formation is often modeled as a static equilibrium problem, neglecting the dynamic processes governing how agents self-organize. This paper proposes a dynamic split-and-merge framework that balances two conflicting economic…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…
Traditional coding theory guarantees valid decoding only if a minority of symbols are adversarially manipulated. In contrast, the game of coding framework ensures reliable decoding, even in the presence of an adversarial majority. This…
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…
Fictitious play (FP) is a canonical game-theoretic learning algorithm which has been deployed extensively in decentralized control scenarios. However standard treatments of FP, and of many other game-theoretic models, assume rather…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
Coding theory plays a crucial role in enabling reliable communication, storage, and computation. Classical approaches assume a worst-case adversarial model and ensure error correction and data recovery only when the number of honest nodes…
We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
In this study, we investigate the stability and solid fraction of columns comprised of highly non-convex particles. These particles are constructed by extruding arms onto the faces of Platonic solids, a configuration we term \emph{Platonic…
Existing approaches to coalition formation often assume that requirements associated with tasks are precisely specified by the human operator. However, prior work has demonstrated that humans, while extremely adept at solving complex…
This paper proposes Hodge Potential Choice (HPC), a new solution for abstract games with irreflexive dominance relations. This solution is formulated by involving geometric tools like differential forms and Hodge decomposition onto abstract…
The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various data-sharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agent's contribution to a coalition is given by his it weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in…