Related papers: Capacitated Network Bargaining Games: Stability an…
An edge-weighted, vertex-capacitated graph G is called stable if the value of a maximum-weight capacity-matching equals the value of a maximum-weight fractional capacity-matching. Stable graphs play a key role in characterizing the…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…
An edge-weighted graph $G=(V,E)$ is called stable if the value of a maximum-weight matching equals the value of a maximum-weight fractional matching. Stable graphs play an important role in some interesting game theory problems, such as…
We study a network extension to the Nash bargaining game, as introduced by Kleinberg and Tardos (STOC'08), where the set of players corresponds to vertices in a graph $G=(V,E)$ and each edge $ij\in E$ represents a possible deal between…
Stabilization of graphs has received substantial attention in recent years due to its connection to game theory. Stable graphs are exactly the graphs inducing a matching game with non-empty core. They are also the graphs that induce a…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
Motivated by understanding non-strict and strict pure strategy equilibria in network anti-coordination games, we define notions of stable and, respectively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings…
We propose a class of cooperative games, called d Partitioned Compbinatorial Optimization Games (PCOGs). The input of PCOG consists of a set of agents and a combinatorial structure (typically a graph) with a fixed optimization goal on this…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…
Combinatorial optimization algorithms for graph problems are usually designed afresh for each new problem with careful attention by an expert to the problem structure. In this work, we develop a new framework to solve any combinatorial…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
Capacitated Domination generalizes the classic Dominating Set problem by specifying for each vertex a required demand and an available capacity for covering demand in its closed neighborhood. The objective is to find a minimum-sized set of…
Energy parity games are infinite two-player turn-based games played on weighted graphs. The objective of the game combines a (qualitative) parity condition with the (quantitative) requirement that the sum of the weights (i.e., the level of…