Related papers: Common Knowledge, Regained
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to this literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally cooperative strategies if they have multiple encounters…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…
We discuss the two moments of human cognition, namely, apprehension (A), whereby a coherent perception emerges from the recruitment of neuronal groups, and judgment(B),that entails the comparison of two apprehensions acquired at different…
Conceptualization, or viewing entities and situations as instances of abstract concepts in mind and making inferences based on that, is a vital component in human intelligence for commonsense reasoning. Despite recent progress in artificial…
The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The…
The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. We introduced the Horn knowledge base dynamics to deal with two important points:…
Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…
We investigate opinion dynamics in a fully-connected system, consisting of $n$ identical and anonymous agents, where one of the opinions (which is called correct) represents a piece of information to disseminate. In more detail, one source…
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the…
Communication facilitates coordination, but coordination might fail if there's too much uncertainty. I discuss a scenario in which vagueness-driven uncertainty undermines the possibility of publicly sharing a belief. I then show that…
The construction of a consistent theory for structuring and representing how concepts combine and interact is one of the main challenges for the scholars involved in cognitive studies. All traditional approaches are still facing serious…
The Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem refers to the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an abstract economy. This model is due to Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu in their pioneering work from 1954. An abstract economy…
Recently, the community has achieved substantial progress on many commonsense reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear what is learned from the training process: the knowledge, inference capability, or both? We argue that due to…
Economists were content with the concept of the Nash equilibrium as game theory's solution concept until Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou showed that finding a Nash equilibrium is most likely a computationally hard problem, a result…
The combination of diverse, pre-existing knowledge is a common explanation for scientific breakthroughs. However, a paradox exists: while scientific output and the potential for such recombination have grown exponentially, the rate of…
The legacy of Post-Modernism is renewed attention to the issues of knowledge production. Now that post-modernism is out of fashion, the emphasis is no longer on the "cursed" questions formulated by its adepts. The main issue is no longer…
Cooperative behavior lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the…
Outside ideal settings, conventions are shaped by competing processes that can challenge the emergence of norms. This paper identifies three trade-offs challenging the diffusion of conventions: (I) the trade-off between the imperatives of…
One of the presuppositions of science since the times of Galileo, Newton, Laplace, and Descartes has been the predictability of the world. This idea has strongly influenced scientific and technological models. However, in recent decades,…