Related papers: Stable partitions for proportional generalized cla…
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…
We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In such games, the grand coalition $[n]$ may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to study the total number of payoff $v_{\Delta}$ of a…
Cooperation between rational users in wireless networks is studied using coalitional game theory. Using the rate achieved by a user as its utility, it is shown that the stable coalition structure, i.e., set of coalitions from which users…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
The CAP theorem asserts a trilemma between consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. This paper introduces a rigorous automata-theoretic and economically grounded framework that reframes the CAP trade-off as a constraint…
Coalition formation is a fundamental type of interaction that involves the creation of coherent groupings of distinct, autonomous, agents in order to efficiently achieve their individual or collective goals. Forming effective coalitions is…
We generalize the stable graph regularity lemma of Malliaris and Shelah to the case of finite structures in finite relational languages, e.g., finite hypergraphs. We show that under the model-theoretic assumption of stability, such a…
In coalition formation games self-organized coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent agents. For each couple of agents $(i,j)$, weight $w_{i,j}=w_{j,i}$ reflects how much agents $i$ and $j$ benefit…
Team assembly is a problem that demands trade-offs between multiple fairness criteria and computational optimization. We focus on four criteria: (i) fair distribution of workloads within the team, (ii) fair distribution of skills and…
A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of…
Graph partitioning problems emerge in a wide variety of complex systems, ranging from biology to finance, but can be rigorously analyzed and solved only for a few graph ensembles. Here, an ensemble of equitable graphs, i.e. random graphs…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
Conformal prediction offers a distribution-free framework for constructing prediction sets with finite-sample coverage. Yet, efficiently leveraging multiple conformity scores to reduce prediction set size remains a major open challenge.…
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI) is an equilibrium-based solution concept for fair division of discrete items to agents with combinatorial demands. In theory, it is known that in asymptotically large markets:…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…