Related papers: Some coordination problems are harder than others
Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…
Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…
Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas requires models that capture the complexity of real-world interactions. While network frameworks have provided valuable insights to model the evolution of cooperation, they are unable to encode…
This paper establishes the equivalence between synchronous and asynchronous coordination mechanisms in dynamic games with strategic complementarities and common interests. Synchronous coordination, characterized by simultaneous commitments,…
Although dynamic games provide a rich paradigm for modeling agents' interactions, solving these games for real-world applications is often challenging. Many real-world interactive settings involve general nonlinear state and input…
Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and specifically as an…
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…
To what extent does the structure of the players' strategy space influence the efficiency of decentralized solutions in congestion games? In this work, we investigate whether better performance are possible when restricting to load…
This paper investigates the relationship between the team-optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium (NE) to assess the impact of self-interested decisions on team performance. In classical team decision problems, team members typically act…
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being…
We present new coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs on $m$ unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy…
Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are two distinct concepts when dealing with multiple criteria. It is well known that the two concepts do not coincide. However, in this work we show that it is possible to characterize the set of all…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…