Related papers: Some coordination problems are harder than others
We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires $poly(N)$ communication in two-player $N \times N$ potential games, and…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games, covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…
Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…
We study data-driven assistants that provide congestion forecasts to users of shared facilities (roads, cafeterias, etc.), to support coordination between them, and increase efficiency of such collective systems. Key questions are: (1) when…